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NOTES
ADDITUR: APPLICATION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
Additur is a conditional order issued on a motion for a new trial, granting
a new trial unless the party relying on the verdict consents to increasing the
award. Its procedural opposite is remittitur, where a new trial is granted un-
less a decrease in the award is agreed to by the party relying on the verdict.'
The granting of new trials on grounds of inadequate or excessive dam-
ages is a great hindrance in judicial administration. Resulting delays and the
increase of litigant's costs are evils that courts and legislatures seek to avoid
by eliminating new trials where damages are the only issue.' Professor
McCormick has written: "New trials . . . are extravagantly wasteful of time
and money, so that judges and lawyers have constantly sought to minimize
this waste by modifying the form of the judge's intervention on the appli-
cation for a new trial."3
Thus, the purpose of these devices is simply the improvement of the
course of litigation by the use of expeditious corrective measures where dam-
ages are excessive or inadequate. In this day of overcrowded court calendars,
devices of this type should be most welcome.
In California, remittitur has been allowed for over a hundred years, 4 and
it now appears that its place as a valid procedure is thoroughly settled.5 The
status of additur, on the other hand, has been confused and unclear.
Before the relatively recent case of Dorsey v. Barba,G appellate courts
in California had indicated that additur was a valid procedure 7 although
the Supreme Court had recognized that a conflict of authority existed.8 In
Dorsey v. Barba, a personal injury action, the plaintiff, upon the rendering
of the jury verdict in his favor, moved for a new trial on the ground of in-
adequate damages. The court issued an additur order, granting a new trial
1 For general surveys of additur and remittitur see Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs,
49 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1942); Comment, 44 YALE L. J. 318 (1934). For a survey of
additur in California see Comment, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 276 (1952). For notes on Cali-
fornia cases see 28 CALIF. L. REV. 533 (1940), 14 So. CAL. L. REV. 490 (1941), 3 STAN.
L. REV. 738 (1951).
2 See Comment, 44 YALE L. J. 318 (1934).
3 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 77 (1935); see also Comment, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 276, 285
(1952).
4 Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952); Hart v. Farris, 218 Cal.
69, 21 P.2d 432 (1933); Miller v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 166 Cal. App. 2d 160, 332
P.2d 746 (1958); Engle v. Farrell, 75 Cal. App. 2d 612, 171 P.2d 588 (1946).
5 Dorsey v. Barba, supra note 4, at 356, 240 P.2d at 609.
6 Supra note 4.
7 Blackmore v. Brennan, 43 Cal. App. 2d 280, 110 P.2d 723 (1941) (additur recog-
nized as established power of trial court); Secreto v. Carlander, 35 Cal. App. 2d 361, 95
P.2d 476 (1939) (additur not accepted by defendant; new trial granted); Adamson v.
County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. App. 125, 198 Pac. 52 (1921) (additur held within
power of trial court to make verdict conform to evidence).
8 Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 2d 668, 107 P.2d 614 (1940).
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unless the defendant agreed to an increase in the award. The defendant
agreed but the plaintiff appealed. The District Court of Appeal for the First
District held that additur, where the damages are unliquidated, constituted
a denial of plaintiff's constitutional right to have a jury determine the
amount of damages.9
In the California Supreme Court the same result was attained in a deci-
sion based largely on the authority of Dimick v. Scbiedt.10 There, on similar
facts, the United States Supreme Court held that a federal district court
did not have the power to issue an additur order. Additur was viewed as an
abridgment of the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the United States
Constitution."
By the same token, the California Supreme Court founded its decision
on the provision under the California Constitution 1 2 which requires the
preservation of all substantive elements of jury trial as they existed at com-
mon law. The final determination of damages was found by the court to be
included among those elements. The court thus concluded that there is an
abridgment of the right to jury trial where a motion for a new trial is denied
upon the defendant's agreement to increase an inadequate award.13
The Dorsey decision, however, did not settle the status of additur com-
pletely since it dealt only with unliquidated damages. Other California de-
cisions were distinguished on procedural or factual grounds rather than
expressly overruled.' 4
Among those cases distinguished was Adamson v. County of Los An-
geles,15 a condemnation proceeding, where additur was used to correct a
jury verdict which had neglected to include compensation for a specific
amount of fenceline. The District Court of Appeal held that a trial court
had the power to issue an additur order to make the verdict conform to
the evidence.16
The Adamson case is distinguished in the Dorsey opinion on the grounds
that, in Adamson, the damages were certain and computable.17 Thus, while
there are few cases upholding this proposition,18 and although the issue has
never been squarely placed before the Supreme Court, it nevertheless ap-
9 Dorsey v. Barba, 226 P.2d 677 (D.C.A. Cal. 1951).
10 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
11 U. S. CONST. amend. VII.
12 CA.m'. CONST. art. I, § 7: "The right to trial by jury shall be secured to all, and
remain inviolate . ... "
13 Dorsey v. Barba, supra note 4, at 358, 240 P.2d at 609.
14 Id. at 356, 240 P.2d at 609.
'5 52 Cal. App. 125, 198 Pac. 52 (1921).
la Id. at 128. 198 Pac. at 55.
27Dorsey v. Barba, supra note 4 at 357n, 240 P.2d at 608n.
Is County of Los Angeles v. Bindge Co., 53 Cal. App. 166, 200 Pac. 27 (1921);
accord, Eaton v. Jones, 107 Cal. 487, 40 Pac. 798 (1895) (property omitted from decree
in quiet title action added by conditional order), Dorsey v. Barba, supra note 9, at 683
(dictum); cf. City of Los Angeles v. Oliver, 102 Cal. App. 299, 283 Pac. 298 (1929).
Reaching the same result by a different approach is United States v. Kennesaw Mountain
Battlefield Ass'n, 99 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied 306 U.S. 646 (1938) (guar-
anties of seventh amendment respecting right to jury trial held not to apply in con-
demnation proceeding).
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pears that additur is allowable in California where the damages are certain
and computable.
The question remains, though, as to the constitutional issue involved in
additur. More precisely, if additur is allowed in a case where the damages
are certain, is plaintiff's right to a jury trial impaired? It appears not, but
the answer is incomplete without the reason behind it.
The California cases provide no answer but other jurisdictions allow
additur only in situations where damages are certain 19 and a clue is pro-
vided by a case from one of those jurisdictions. In Rudnick v. Jacobs, 20 a
Delaware personal injury case, where a verdict for special damages omitted
an item which had been proved and was unquestioned, additur was allowed
to the extent of the omitted item. The following quotation presents the
court's rationale in allowing additur: 2 '
... [T]he verdict in effect reduced plaintiff's claim to one for the recovery
of definite pecuniary sums which are calculable to a penny. In such a case there
can be no possible injury to the plaintiff if the court should direct an additur
sufficient to cover the utmost of his claims. The jury could not have properly
allowed him more.
The key words in the Delaware court's analysis are, "The jury could not
have properly allowed him more." They imply that there is a restricted jury
function which is not encroached upon by an additur order in a case where
the damages are certain and computable. This suggestion appears to be valid
in the light of an analysis of the cases where the damages are certain, which
analysis proposes their classification into two distinct categories. 22
The first category is where the claim is so certain and uncontroverted that
a jury could properly find only one amount, as in an action to recover a sta-
tutory penalty or an action on an ordinary promissory note. In such a case the
nature of the cause of action alleged in the pleadings is determinative. Es-
tablishing the right to recover, in effect, automatically decides the amount.2 3
If, by oversight or by computational error, the amount is incorrect, an ad-
ditur order can properly be issued to correct the mistake. There is no in-
fringement of the right to a jury trial since the jury has implicitly rendered
the only appropriate money verdict as part of its decision regarding defend-
ant's liability.
The second category of case where the damages are certain is marked
by the definitive character of the damages, as a matter of law. This is often
19 Kraas v. American Bakeries Co., 231 Ala. 278, 164 So. 565 (1935) (additur al-
lowed as to items of damage definitely established by the evidence but omitted from the
verdict); E. Tris Napier Co. v. Gloss, 150 Ga. 561, 104 S.E. 230 (1920) (additur al-
lowed, on defendant's counterclaim, to include definite and specific amounts to which
defendant entitled, and which plaintiff agreed to pay, but which the jury had failed
to include); Yep Hong v. Williams, 6 II. 2d 456, 128 N.E.2d 655 (1955) (additur lim-
ited to cases where the inadequacy of the verdict is due to the omission of some specific,
definitely calculable item, and may not be extended to tort actions for recovery of unliq-
uidated damages); Fall v. Tucker, 113 Kan. 713, 216 Pae. 283 (1923) (additur author-
ized when the deficiency can be ascertained by a mathematical calculation).
2039 Del. (9 Harr.) 169, 197 At. 381 (1938).
21 Id. at 171, 197 Atl. at 383.
22 Carlin, supra note 1, at 25 suggests an analysis of the remittitur cases is applicable
to additur as well.
23 Carlin, supra note 1, at 5.
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